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Abstract
Most of the literature on vertical coordination and its impact on farm performance
and farmer wellbeing deal with high-value or modern food supply chains, including
export chains and chains dominated by large international supermarkets or other
forms of foreign direct investment. The impact of vertical coordination mechanisms
in local food supply chains in developing countries remains underexplored. This
paper analyzes the impact of participation of honey producers in the Northern
highlands of Tigray, Ethiopia in contracts and marketing cooperatives on their
performance and wellbeing. The paper finds positive production and economic
gains honey producers obtain from contract engagement. Honey producers under
the contract scheme produce more white honey fulfilling the demand of processors,
buyers and consumers. Contracting results in higher production due to the better
access it causes to technology and skill transfers. Moreover, better conditions contracts
offer motivates honey producers to produce more and supply larger to the market.
Keywords: Supply chain coordination, Honey production, Ethiopia
JEL code: Q13
Background
The transformation of agricultural marketing systems in sub-Saharan Africa remains
slow, even after the liberalization and globalization of trade. The rural agricultural mar-
keting system in developing countries fails to adjust and fully respond to changes in
the market in terms of quality and quantity (Jayne et al., 2010). As in many countries
and regions in sub-Saharan Africa, the marketing system in the rural highlands of
Ethiopia does not perform well due to several challenges (Gabre-Madhin, 2001).
The poor economic conditions, the imperfect input and product markets, the large
number of smallholders, the high transaction costs in searching buyers, the lack of
private sector investment in processing and agri-business and the poor coordination
among actors in the agrifood supply chain are cited as the factors that restrain the
performance of food supply chains in developing countries (Dorward et al., 22007;
Gabre-Madhin, 2001). Institutions for market information, standardizing, grading and
labeling, and contract enforcement are also weak, which further undermines the per-
formance of the agricultural marketing system. Poor road and communication
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infrastructure, thin input and output markets, underdeveloped monetary systems are
further claimed to affect the rural areas in Africa (Dorward et al., 2007).
Theory and empirical evidence suggest that vertical coordination (VC) can foster the
development of smallholder agriculture through the provision of inputs and technology,
and the mitigation of transaction costs (Williamson, 1979; Swinnen and Maertens,
2007). Empirical evidence from Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin-America suggests that
contracts offer credit, inputs, better prices and extension services which enable growers
to be productive and secure better economic benefits (e.g., Minten et al., 2007; Dries et
al., 2009; Maertens et al., 2011). Also cooperatives can facilitate the access of small-
holder farmers to farm resources, especially for poor farmers. They facilitate access to
credit and reap the benefit of significant support from state and other development
partners (Key and Runsten, 1999; Bijman and Hu, 2011). Cooperatives can also help
empower farmers in terms of collective ownership of farm investment and processing
technology (Hendrikse and Bijman, 2002). Marketing cooperatives are also found influ-
encing smallholders’ commercialization behavior in Ethiopia and having poverty impact
in Rwanda though the results indicate better benefits to larger farmers (Bernard et al.
2008; Francesconi and Nico 2010; Verhofstadt and Maertens, 2014).
Researchers and policy-makers are optimistic about the observed increased VC in
food supply chains as it can contribute to the transformation of traditional agricultural
practices towards modern supply chains (Abebaw and Haile, 2013). However, the im-
pact of VC on the performance of smallholder farms remains controversial. Empirical
evidence from organic coffee producers in Uganda, tomato producers in Senegal, and
apple and green onion producers in China have indicated positive income gains of
contract-farming (Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Miyata et al., 2009; Bolwig et al., 2010).
The observed increase in smallholders’ income is attributed to buyers’ commitment for
the supply of inputs, technology and extension services; which enables farmers to
increase productivity. In China and Uganda farmers under a contracting scheme
were found to be efficient as they received extension skills to manage inputs, feed,
labor, and capital (Miyata et al., 2009; Bolwig et al. 2010). Furthermore, contract
farming leads to better quality produce and premium prices, resulting in larger
economic benefits for farmers. Contracting also may reduce transaction costs, and
leads to more efficient transactions in food supply chains (Miyata et al., 2009). Fur-
thermore, contracts may channel capital/financial support to farmers to ease ex-
pansion of firms (Simmons et al., 2005; Dries et al., 2009). Spillover effects may
also contribute to the productivity of smallholder farmers in various developing
countries (Schipmann and Qaim, 2010).
In cases where farmers fail to access contracts due to their small size, processors
and rural development agencies sometimes supply credit and inputs via coopera-
tives (Abebaw and Haile 2013; Bernard et al., 2008). Cooperatives or farmers’ orga-
nizations generally pool resources to facilitate access to specific assets, reduce
information asymmetries, empower smallholders in the market, and facilitate orga-
nized support from credit and technology suppliers (Bernard et al., 2008; Bijman
and Hendrikse, 2003; Bijman and Hu, 2011; Blandon et al., 2009). Cooperatives
also lower transactions costs for providing extension services and information
(Masakure and Henson, 2005), and facilitate the adoption of new technologies
(Nwankwo et al., 2009; Abebaw and Haile 2013).
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Despite its wide application in developing countries, contracts are sometimes criti-
cized for exploiting farmers (Singh, 2002). Unequal power relations between contrac-
tors and contracted producers can lead to contract conditions in favor of large-scale
companies and to the exploitation of farmers. Furthermore, contracts are also accused
of eroding the autonomy/flexibility of farmers in making farm decisions (Gillespie and
Eidman, 1998; Key, 2004). A much debated issue is the exclusion of the poorest farmers
and the smallest farms from contract farming schemes. High administrative costs of con-
tracting with a large number of small producers foster contracting with larger farms.
Asset-poor farmers may face difficulties in complying with processor/retailer specific stan-
dards and requirements, resulting in the exclusion of poor farmers from contract-farming
schemes (Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003). However, producer-induced organizations
such as cooperatives help tackle the exclusion of smallholders and offer significant eco-
nomic benefits to smallholders (Staal et al., 1997; Takane, 2004; Bijman and Hu, 2011).
Most of the literature on VC and its impact on farm performance and farmer well-
being deals with so-called high-value or modern food supply chains, including export
chains and chains dominated by large international supermarkets or other forms of
foreign direct investment. The impact of VC mechanisms (contracts and marketing
cooperatives altogether in contrast to spot markets) in local food supply chains in
developing countries especially in the Ethiopian context remains underexplored though
the challenges in the traditional domestic markets in the African context are well stud-
ied (Dorward et al., 2006). Comparative studies on the impact of hybrids, contracts and
marketing cooperatives viz. spot market transactions are scare. In this paper, we analyze
the impact of participation of honey producers in the Northern highlands of Ethiopia
in contracts and cooperatives on their performance and household income. We, thus
contribute to the literature on VC by providing evidence from local food chains and
provide insights that can inform governmental and development organizations on the
realization of pro-poor growth through institutional innovations such as contracts and
marketing cooperatives in supply chains in partnership with the private sector.
The practice of beekeeping in Ethiopia is integrated with crop farming and animal
husbandry at household level. It is part of the integrated household extension program
targeted to diversify household livelihood and income (Egziabher et al. 2013; Legesse,
2014). CSA (2013) reported that there were nearly 5.21 million beehives in Ethiopia,
producing 45,100 tons of honey, of which about 38 % was for household consumption,
58 % for the market and the rest for wage payment. Production of honey grows every
year; for eg. It grows from 24,000 tons in 1993 to 45,100 tons in 2012. In terms of
honey production, the country is ranked 9th in the world which may offer an advantage
to capitalize on the subsector (FAO 2015). Honey export has increased from 1.5 tons in
2000, 275 tons in 2010 and more than 730 tons in 2012 (Legesse, 2014). Honey produc-
tion and marketing in Ethiopia is largely at household level and on spot market bases.
However recently, production cooperatives, marketing cooperatives and contract base
transactions in the honey subsector are emerging to offer producers with required
inputs, technology, market information and market access thereby reducing transaction
costs. However, this paper is limited to the impact of contracts and marketing coopera-
tives on the income of honey producing households in Tigray, Northern Ethiopia.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section two the honey production
and marketing system in Ethiopia is briefly reviewed. In the third section the study site
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is presented and data collection procedures are explained. In the fourth section the
coordination mechanisms and performance of honey producers are discussed based on
descriptive statistics. The econometric methods and estimation procedures are ex-
plained in the fifth section, and econometric results are discussed in the sixth section.
The last section ends the paper with conclusions and implications.
Honey Production and Marketing in Ethiopia and Tigray
Honey production has a long tradition in Ethiopia. The practice of beekeeping in Ethiopia
is often integrated with crop farming and animal husbandry. In many regions of the coun-
try, beekeeping is an important additional income-generating activity for farmers, next to
cropping and livestock rearing. Currently, the honey sector is part of the integrated house-
hold extension program runn by the government to imprve productivity and increase
household income (Egziabher et al. 2013). It is also believed to be one of the subsectors
which tend to be inclusive of smallholders in Ethiopia (Paulos, 2012). Apiculture can im-
portantly contribute to the livelihood of rural households, either by providing additional
income through honey sale or by providing a high-nutritious food product for household
consumption. Honey production is regarded as a poverty reduction strategy and as a tool
for combating malnutrition in rural areas of developing countries (Legesse, 2014).
The honey production has grown almost every year from 24,000 tons in 1993 to
45,000 tons in 2013 (FAO, 2015). Most honey (more than 95 %) is produced using trad-
itional beehives. However, traditional beehives produce less than 10 kg of honey/hive/
year. The modern beehive provides on average 23 kg of clean honey per hive/year
(CSA, 2013). However, modern hives are costly (on average USD 50.00) compared to
the locally made traditional hives that costs no more than USD 5.00. CSA (2013) esti-
mated that 38.31 % was for household consumption, 58.49 % was for the market largely
for domestic market (more than 98 %) and the rest was used as wage payment. Most of
the honey production is carried out by smallholder farmers. It has a prospect of further
growth if it is well integrated with the global food chains and supported with relevant
inputs and technology. Nearly 4.4 % of the beehives are found in Tigray which accounts
for 5.2 % of the total honey production in Ethiopia (CSA 2013). More than 20 % were
modern beehives implying more modern beehive technology use in the region (CSA
2013) and the majority of honey is offered to the market (more than 60 %).
There is an increasing trend in the production of honey from modern beehives.
Modern beehives and honey extracting technology are mostly supplied by government
agencies and non-governmental organizations (e.g., ARDO, REST-local NGO which
stands for Relief Society of Tigray, World Vision, the Ethiopian Orthodox and the
Catholic Church). For example, in 2008 the Regional Agricultural and Rural Development
Office (ARDO) provided 26,676 units of modern beehives to smallholders in Tigray.
Honey export was below 1 % of production up until 2006. However, once the govern-
ment and development partners have aggressively distributed modern hives, processing
companies has acquired more honey supply and expand honey export. The honey
export increased from one ton in 2001 to 615 tons in 2010 and 729 tons in 2013. It is
destined mainly to Yemen, Sudan, Saudi Arabia and Djibouti before getting the admi-
siion to penetrate the EU market in 2008 (Gezahegn et al. 2006; Paulos 2012).
The 2010 estimate of honey production in Tigray was 2,768 tons, which accounts for
5.2 % of the total honey production in Ethiopia (CSA, 2013). There were 213,133
Alemu et al. Agricultural and Food Economics  (2016) 4:9 Page 4 of 21
beehives in Tigray in 2010. More than 20 % were modern beehives (CSA, 2013) and
the majority of honey is offered to the market (more than 60 %). As reported by Mel-
aku et al. (2008), 80 to 90 % of the honey produced in the Atsbi district was marketed,
which points to the market-oriented nature of honey production in the region. There is
an increasing trend in the production of honey from modern beehives; i.e., 269 tons in
2005 to 1061 tons in 2010. ARDO, NGOs and processors contribute to the expansion
of modern beehives in the region.
Most of the honey produced and marketed in Tigray is white honey, while only
a small amount of yellow and red honey is produced and marketed. White honey
is high value honey that is harvested during the prime season (September to
December) and almost entirely sold by farmers. During the dry season, farmers
may harvest some honey, but due to the scarcity of flowers and plants, bees mix
species result in a change in color for the honey. Part of the yellow and red honey
is being kept at home for consumption or medicinal use (Gezahegn et al. 2006;
Melaku et al., 2008). To improve honey production and marketing, government
and NGOs (like World Vision, SNV-Ethiopia, REST) have intervened to upgrade
beehives and extraction process, transfer technology through training and supplying
credit and inputs.
As production of honey is largely in the hands of smallholders who own only a few
beehives, it offers a small amount to the market from which the majority (about 80 %)
is supplied to local mead brewers (Gezahegn et al. 2006; Melaku et al., 2008). The
subsector is also facing a number of challenges such as lack of adequate technology,
extension services, beekeeping materials and lack of adequate market (Abebe and
Ranjitha, 2011).
Nevertheless, to improve honey production and the marketing system in the country,
government and other non-governmental development organizations (like World
Vision, SNV-Ethiopia, REST) have intervened to a great extent in terms of modernizing
the beehives and the extraction process, transferring technology through training,
upgrading the honey value chains, and supplying credit and other inputs (Paulos 2012).
Honey is marketed mostly on spot markets, either by selling it directly to consumers
or by selling it to buyers (mead houses or retailers). Contracts between farmers and
buyers (retailers, mead houses) or processors are scarce and largely oral. Only the pri-
vate processing company Dimma employs written contracts to obtain honey from
farmers or cooperatives. The obligation of the supplier (honey producer) includes the
supply of a specified amount of honey with a specified quality and delivery date to
Dimma. The contract also stipulates the obligations of Dimma including paying a fixed
price per kilogram during the time of delivery and delivering honey at a specified place
(producers place) by sending their own procurement experts. Dimma has signed con-
tracts with marketing cooperatives listing the name of each member in the contract.
The contract also stipulates the modern beehive, extractors, smokers and honey con-
tainers provided to the marketing cooperatives. The agreements also specify conditions
to terminate the contract but any of the contracting party is required to inform ahead
of time (1 month earlier).
Formal cooperative establishment in ethiopia dates back to 1960. Since then further
expansion and declarations have been in place. Thre was a new proclamation by the
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) in 2002 and establish Federal
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Cooperative Agency to organize and promote cooperatives at national level. Differ-
ent types of cooperatives are established in diffecent rural hillages (kebeles)
throughout the nation: producer cooperatives, marketing cooperatives, multipurpose
cooperatives, consumers’ cooperatives (Bernard et al., 2008; Emana, 2009; Bernard
and Alemayehu 2008).
With regard to cooperatives in Tigray, The survey conducted by the Agricultural
Transformation Agency of Ethiopia has indicated that there were no cooperatives
before 1991 (Bernard et al. 2008). Farmer cooperatives in the honey sector were
launched once private beekeeping and honey processing company (Dimma) transferred
its own apiary sites to selected farmers who were living closer to the apiary sites. These
cooperatives are operating in the production and marketing of honey. Farmer coopera-
tives possess common apiary sites and individual beehives and obligate members to
commit themselves to take care of apiary cites. They also have common processing
technology such as honey extractors, masks and smokers that are provided by govern-
ment or other development partners (e.g. ARDO, REST, and World Vision). The mar-
keting cooperatives not only collect honey from farmers but provide different
processing technology to honey producers. They also facilitate access to credit to
acquire modern beehives for their members. These cooperatives also supply honey for
the other processing companies (Wukiro Mar and Wolela Mar) that are operating at
small-scale level.
Cooperatives established in Tigray are multipurpose cooperatives, marketing cooper-
atives, producer cooperatives and credit and saving cooperatives. Honey producers are
memebrs of marketing cooperatives to supply honey to buyers specifically to Dimma
beekeeping and honey processing. They also supplied honey for Wukiro Mar and
Wolela Mar though they raise the issue of traceability problem while getting supply
from marketing cooperatives. For this study, those members of honey marketing coop-
eratives are considered.
Methods
We apply a case study approach, using data from the Geba catchment in the Tigray re-
gion in northern Ethiopia. This area was chosen as a focus site for a large collaborative
and interdisciplinary research project which this study is part of.
Background
The situation concerning beehive ownership and honey production in the northern
highlands of Ethiopia is similar to the rest of the country. Most rural households
possess traditional and modern beehives and produce small amounts of honey for
the market and for household consumption, next to a range of other farm and
non-farm activities. The number of traditional and modern beehives in Tigray is
estimated to be 229,629 (61,311 modern and transitional, 168,315 traditional) and
total honey production 3,272 tons, constituting 5 % of the national production
(CSA, 2013).
Large volumes of honey are produced from traditional beehives and traditional
extraction systems. These traditional systems often fail to meet processors’ quality re-
quirements. Due to intensive intervention by the government and by development
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partners, a shift from traditional to modern beehives is ongoing. This modernization
has resulted in increased honey production and increased market supply stimulating
producers and government to establish marketing cooperatives to empower producers
in the market. Honey producers are increasingly seeking for better and more secure
market outlets through contracts and cooperatives. In addition, the problem of adulter-
ation and poor harvesting practices makes it difficult for processors to source sufficient
volumes of good quality honey, which drives them to contract with individual honey
producers and marketing cooperatives and offer extension services as part of the
contracts.
Data collection
A household survey was organized in the case study area in the period April-May
2010. As the aim of the study is to evaluate the different coordination mecha-
nisms in the honey supply chain, honey producers possessing modern beehives
who are registered by the rural development office were purposively selected.
These households are selected expecting that they offer surplus honey to the mar-
ket as they exploit modern technology. In the first stage of the sampling design,
four districts (woredas) were selected out of a total of 10 districts in the Geba
catchment area. The districts with the largest beekeeping households and with
actual and potential surplus honey production were selected. These districts were
identified in consultation with the district livestock experts in the Rural Develop-
ment Office (RDO).
The selected districts, and the sampled producers in these districts, are men-
tioned in Table 1. In a second stage of the sampling design, all the sub-districts
(tabias), all households’ possessing modern beehives registered in the Tabia rural
development offices were selected. The offices often supply modern beehives,
extraction technology, smokers, etc. to generate income for the household. It is
assumed that rural households involved in this extension package are likely to be
commercial beekeepers, supplying at least some produce to the market. In the
third stage, households from a list of all households included in the small-scale
beekeeping extension package were randomly selected. This list of households was
provided by the district livestock experts in the government extension offices. In
this way, a total of 412 honey producers in 8 sub-districts were selected. Data
collection was administered using trained enumerators.
Table 1 Distribution of sample households
Name of Woreda (district) Tabia selected Number of selected respondents
Ofla/Southern zone Hashenge 52
Menkere 28
Kilite Aulalo Genfel 34
Aynalem 43
Degua Temben Ainberkekin 64
Debrenazreth 63
Atsbi Hayelom 65
Barka Adisebiha 63
Total 412
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Coordination mechanisms and performance of honey producers
Coordination mechanisms
Honey producers in the case study area are involved in three different types of market-
ing coordination arrangements, including spot market transactions (81 % of sampled
producers), contract arrangements (12.5 %) and marketing cooperative arrangements
(6.5 %). Some contract producers also sell honey through spot market arrangements.
Cooperatives usually restrict member farmers not to participate in other types of trans-
actions. Side selling by members usually involves disciplinary actions such as
cancellation of membership. Those who are expelled from membership are devoid of
access to modern hives on creditwhich are provided through cooperatives.
Socioeconomic characteristics
In Table 2 we compare some general characteristics of contract producers, cooperative
producers and other producers. The results show that apiculture is a male-dominated
activity but that cooperatives involve a slightly higher share of female producers.
Table 2 Socioeconomic characteristics of honey producers
Variable Sample Average Contract Cooperative Spot market (base)
Sex (male = 1, female = 0) 0.92 0.97 0.86 a 0.92
(0.01) (0.03) (0.07) (0.01)
Age in years 43.65 39.91 b 43.18 44.08
(0.62) (1.53) (2.58) (0.70)
Household size in number 6.22 6.51 5.64 a 6.23
(0.11) (0.40) (0.40) (0.11)
Illiterate (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.46 0.34 a 0.46 0.47
(0.03) (0.08) (0.10) (0.03)
At least primary education (1 = yes, 0 = no) 0.56 0.66 a 0.54 0.53
(0.03) (0.08) (0.10) (0.03)
Active family size (number) 2.53 2.51 2.50 2.54
(0.05) (0.22) (0.24) (0.06)
Experience (years) 7.34 7.71 7.38 7.29
(0.35) (1.19) (1.56) (0.37)
Land size (hectares) 0.86 0.95 0.89 0.85
(0.03) (0.08) (0.11) (0.03)
Tropical livestock units 4.62 4.68 4.44 4.63
(0.21) (0.47) (0.89) (0.24)
Tropical livestock units 5 years (recall) 4.30 4.52 4.20 4.29
(0.32) (0.74) (0.82) (0.36)
Distance to asphalt road (km) 21.39 29.79 c 32.07 c 19.60
(0.88) (3.03) (2.78) (0.94)
Distance to Mekelle (km) 71.80 66.67 55.48 b 72.52
(2.13) (6.94) (5.54) (2.37)
No. of observations 395 35 28 332
Source: Calculated from own survey data
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors
a.b,c significance at 10, 5 and 1 % significance level for the t-test
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Contracted producers are younger and better educated than producers in cooperatives
or on the spot market. We find no difference in experience and in ownership of land
and livestock between contract producers, cooperative producers and other producers.
Cooperative producers are located furthest from the road but closest to Mekelle, the
regional capital. Also contract producers are located further from a road than
producers operating in sport markets.
Honey production, marketing and income
In Table 3 we compare the three different types of honey producers with respect to
honey production and marketing. These figures indicate that contract producers pos-
sess a larger number of modern beehives, produce larger volumes of white honey, have
a higher productivity per hive, sell a higher amount of honey in the market, and have
higher incomes in general and from honey in particular in contrast to spot market pro-
ducers. We find no differences in beehive possession, honey production, hive product-
ivity and income between cooperative members and spot market suppliers.
Comparing the number of current modern beehives possession from what they had
5 years ago, the figures in Table 3 show that there has been an increase in the average
number of modern beehives for all types of producers. Almost half of the farmers in
the sample, 49 %, have at least one modern hive. This increase is partially the result of
government and NGO interventions to supply modern hive technology, training and
Table 3 Production and marketing of honey for different producers
Variable Sample mean Contract Cooperative Spot market (base)
No. of traditional beehives 1.44 0.89 1.43 1.50
(0.27) (0.30) (1.07) (0.31)
No. of modern Beehives 3.71 5.97 b 2.29 3.59
(0.33) (1.43) (0.34) (0.35)
No. of modern beehives 5 years ago(recall) 1.67 1.57 0.96 1.14
(0.12) (0.38) (0.39) (0.13)
White honey production (kg) 22.45 47.40 c 15.93 20.37
(1.52) (10.01) (2.97) (1.38)
Amount of honey for market (kg) 27.24 43.71 a 15.61 26.48
(3.26) (3.72) (2.93) (3.72)
Honey production per beehive (kg) 7.61 9.82 b 8.57 7.29
(0.39) (1.19) (1.66) (0.43)
Honey income (birr) 1821 3625 c 884 1710
(196) (1020) (163) (205)
Total household income (birr) 8888 10940 a 7302 8806
(523) (1827) (1494) (578)
Average per capita income (birr) d 3271 4059 2660 3239
(203) (704) (4378) (226)
No. of observations 395 35 28 332
Source: Calculated from own survey data
Figures in parenthesis are standard errors
a.b,c significance at 10, 5 and 1 % significance level for the t-test
d per capita income adult equivalent (OECD-modified scale which assigns value 1 for the household head, of 0.5 to each
adult member and 0.3 to each child is used)
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extension to enhance honey production and quality, as part of a poverty-reduction
strategy. Different projects, e.g. ARDO (credit from Dedebit Credit and Saving Institu-
tion and other development partners), the Myzegzeg project, World Vision, the Cath-
olic Church and the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahido Church, provided modern beehives
and technology to farmers and 35 % of honey producers in the sample received modern
technology through this channel. The Dimma Honey Processing Company also pro-
vides beehives to honey producers and cooperative members committing to supply
honey to the company; this is the case for 3 % of producers in the sample. Some pro-
ducers bought modern beehives themselves or received them from other buyers.
Honey producers in the districts report the receipt of extension services to improve
honey quality which include the provision of modern hives, training on honey extrac-
tion and quality standards, and the provision of equipment such as smokers and masks.
Thirty percent of the honey producers operating in spot markets and 28.6 % of the
cooperative members and 17 % of contract participants did not make further invest-
ment on buying modern hives and technology to improve quality. Twenty percent of
the contract participants obtained credit and technology support from processors and
buyers. A large part of the cooperative members and contract producers indicates that
honey sales and incomes are increasing from year to year. However, nearly 31 % of the
spot market producers say their honey sales go down.
Econometric approach
The descriptive statistics presented in the previous section indicates that honey
producers who market their produce through contracts have more modern bee-
hives, a higher total and per hive honey production, and a higher income in total
and from beekeeping specifically. However, based on a simple comparison of aver-
ages across honey producers in different coordination channels, it is impossible to
identify causality. To reveal whether the observed differences in performance
between contract producers, cooperative producers and spot-market producers are
attributable to the different coordination channels, a more profound econometric
analysis is needed.
Three different methods are used to analyze the impact of contract and cooperative
coordination in the honey supply chain on producers’ performance. First, a simple
regression model is used – referred to as regression on covariates. It is clear from the
descriptive statistics in the previous sections, that there are important differences
between contract, cooperative and spot-market employing honey producers in terms of
observable characteristics. These differences indicate that participation in contracts and
cooperatives is not randomly distributed over the population of honey producers, but
influenced by households’ physical, human and social capital endowments, and their
access to markets and road infrastructure. To correct for the potential bias that may
arise from this non-random selection into contracts and cooperatives, a large set of
observable covariates is included as control variables in the estimation
Y i ¼ αþ γ1C1i þ γ2C2i þ βXi þ εi ð1Þ
We look at five different outcome variables Y: (1) hive productivity (kg), (2) honey
production (kg), (3) honey income (birr), (4) total household income (birr), and (5) per
capita household income (birr) and these variables are log-specified in the model. The
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variables C1 and C2 represent the different coordination mechanism, contracts and co-
operatives respectively. These are the main variables of interest and the coefficients
γ1 and γ2 are referred to as the treatment effects of contracts and cooperatives re-
spectively. The vector X includes a large set of observable covariates to correct for
potential bias due to selection on observables: village dummy, distance to RDO,
distance to asphalt road, land size, number of beehives, number of children, educa-
tion, age, and household size. This model is estimated using Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimation.
The second estimation is based on estimated propensity scores – or a conditional
probability to contract or to join cooperatives – and uses these as additional control
variables in the regression model. This model is referred as regression on propensity
scores. Adding the propensity score as an additional control variable in the regression
further reduces the potential bias created by selection on observable characteristics
(Imbens, 2004). Because there are two different treatments, contract and cooperatives,
that are mutually exclusive1, a bivariate probit model is used to estimate the probability
for each treatment, conditional on the set of covariates X (Lechner 1999, 2002). The
model is specified as follows:
Y i ¼ αþ γ1C1i þ γ2C2i þ μ1PS1i þ μ2PS2i þ βXi þ εi ð2Þ
withPS1i ¼ p C1 ¼ 1X
 
andPS2i ¼ p C2 ¼ 1X
 
Third, the effect of contracts and cooperatives on the performance of honey pro-
ducers is estimated using a propensity score matching technique, which is referred
to as matching on the propensity score. This method is widely applied in the agri-
cultural and development economics literature (e.g., Maertens and Swinnen, 2009;
Ito et al. 2012; Jena et al. 2012; Abebaw and Haile 2013; Egziabher et al. 2013)
and has been referred to as the best option next to randomization and experimen-
tal design in solving selection bias (Khandker et al., 2010). As Khandher et al.
(2010: 54) put it: “when we fail to randomize treatment, the next best option is to
use an observational analogue to mimic randomization with matching and one can
set up a counterfactual similar to the treatment group in terms of observed charac-
teristics”. Propensity score matching involves matching treated households with
control households that are similar in terms of observable characteristics (Imbens
and Angrist; 1995; Imbens, 2004; Caliendo and Sabine 2005). As matching directly
on observable characteristics is difficult if the set of potentially relevant character-
istics is large, matching on propensity scores has been proposed as a valid method
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). All contract producers and all cooperative pro-
ducers (the treated observations) in the sample are matched with one or several
spot market producers (the control observations) who have similar propensity
scores, with propensity scores as defined in equation (1). The effect of contracts
and cooperatives on honey producers’ performance can then be calculated as a
weighted difference in outcome between treated observations and matched
controls:
ATE1 ¼ E Y1−Y0ð Þ ¼ 1N1
X
i∈N1
Y 1i−Y 0ð Þ f or C1 ¼ 1 ð3Þ
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ATE2 ¼ E Y2−Y0ð Þ ¼ 1N2
X
i∈N2
Y 2i−Y 0ð Þ f or C2 ¼ 1 ð4Þ
where, ATE1 and ATE2 represent the average treatment effects from contracts and
cooperatives respectively, N1 and N2 the number of households participating in con-
tracts and cooperatives, Y1and Y2 the outcomes for contract and cooperative farmers
and Y0 of the outcome for the control group (spot market producers).
Two different matching procedures are used. Nearest neighbor matching, in which
every treated household is matched to the control household with the closest propen-
sity score. This is the most commonly applied matching algorithm in propensity score
matching estimation (Ichino et al., 2008). It is complemented with a kernel matching
technique, in which information from all control observations is used to compute the
Average Treatment Effect (ATE) estimate (Caliendo and Sabine 2005). For kernel
matching the biweight kernel type and the default bandwidth in STATA (0.06) are used.
Matching is always done with replacement and only observations in the common sup-
port region – where the propensity score of the control units is not smaller than the
minimum propensity score of the treated units and the propensity score of the treated
units not larger than the maximum propensity score of the control units – are used in
the analysis. As propensity score matching methods are sensitive to the exact specifica-
tion and matching method, the use of different matching techniques serves as a robust-
ness check.
Propensity score matching is based on two assumptions: conditional independence
(CI) and common support (CS). The first assumption refers to potential outcomes
being independent of treatment assignment, given a set of observable covariates X
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia and Wahba, 2002; Lechner 2002; Ichino et
al. 2008):
Y0;Y1;Y2⊥C Xj ð5Þ
The second assumption refers to sufficient overlap in the distribution of the propen-
sity scores for treated and control observations (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; Dehejia
and Wahba, 2002; Lechner 2002; Ichino et al. 2008):
0 < P C ¼ 1 Xj Þ < 1ð ð6Þ
These assumptions are addressed after the discussion of the results.
Results and discussion
Impact of contracts and cooperatives on farm performance
The main results regarding the effect of the two treatment variables (contracts and
cooperatives) on five performance indicators (hive productivity, honey production,
honey income, household income, per capita income) from four alternative estimation
techniques (regression on covariates, regression on propensity score, kernel matching
and nearest neighbor matching) are given in Tables 4 and 5.
On the one hand, the econometric results confirm that participating in contracts
results in significantly higher hive productivity, higher total honey production, and
higher producer incomes. Taking the most conservative estimates, we find that contract
production increases the productivity of modern beehives by 37 % and the total annual
Alemu et al. Agricultural and Food Economics  (2016) 4:9 Page 12 of 21
Table 4 Effect of contracts and cooperatives on honey producing farmers
Outcome variables Regression on covariates Regression on propensity scores Kernel Matching Nearest Neighbor
Contract cooperative Contract Cooperative Contract Cooperative Contract Cooperative
Modern hive productivity 0.37 c (0.14) 0.09 (0.19) 0.38 c (0.14) 0.08 (0.19) 0.44 b (0.14) -0.06 (0.21) 0.43 b (0.14) -0.13 (0.21)
White honey production 0.76 c (0.17) -0.15 (0.18) 0.77 c (0.17) -0.15 (0.19) 0.79 c (0.20) -0.10 (0.20) 0.78 c (0.20) -0.14 (0.21)
Honey income 0.87 c (0.24) -0.49 (0.35) 0.85 c (0.25) -0.47 (0.35) 1.10 c (0.26) -0.41 (0.35) 1.10 c (0.28) -0.44 (0.35)
Household income 0.28 a (0.16) 0.01 (0.20) 0.28 c (0.16) 0.01 (0.20) 0.31 a (0.18) -0.14 (0.21) 0.31 a (0.18) -.022 (0.21)
Per capita income 0.32 b (0.16) 0.01 (0.20) 0.31 a (0.16) 0.01 (0.20) 0.36 a (0.18) -0.14 (0.20) 0.36 a (0.18) -0.21 (0.20)
a,b,c indicates significance levels at 10,5 and 1 % respectively
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amount of production of honey with 76 %. In addition, income from honey pro-
duction increases with 85 %, total household income with 28 % and per capita in-
come with 31 % if honey is produced under contract. These are large and
important effects, which show that contract farming and the technology transfers
and reduced transaction costs that contracting entails, can be a tool for income
growth in rural areas of developing countries. Our results show that the positive
effects of contract farming on productivity and producer income that previous
studies showed for high-value crops and export-oriented food chains (e.g. Key and
McBride 2003; Maertens and Swinnen, 2009; Maertens et al., 2011; Miyata et al.,
2009) also hold for lower-value produce and local food chains.
On the other hand, we do not find an effect of participating in cooperatives on hive
productivity, honey production or household income. None of the estimated effects of
cooperatives on hive productivity, honey production, honey income, total household in-
come and per capita household income in the four different models are significant
(Table 6). A possible explanation for the lack of an effect of cooperatives on farm per-
formance is mismanagement in the cooperatives. The visited honey cooperatives in the
study areas are found performing under capacity, losing their queen bees due to free
Table 5 Regression on covariates and regression on PS (HH income as dependent variable)
Covariates Regression on covariates Regression on PS
Coefficient Std. err. Coefficient Std. err.
Contract 0.28 a 0.16 0.28 a 0.17
Cooperative 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.21
PSContract 0.79 1.41
PSCooperative -0.96 1.87
Atsibi -0.81 b 0.41 -0.86 b 0.43
Kiltie awlalo -1.20 c 0.42 -1.25 c 0.43
Ofla (omitted) (omitted)
Dega temben -1.48 c 0.57 -1.51 c 0.58
Age, household head -0.02 c 0.01 -0.01 a 0.01
Illiterate, household head -0.16 0.12 -0.13 0.13
Household size -0.01 0.04 -0.03 0.05
Active family 0.10 a 0.06 0.12 a 0.07
Production Experience 0.02 b 0.01 0.01 a 0.01
Land size 0.28 0.28 0.14 0.33
Land size2 0.11 0.11 0.17 0.14
Tropical livestock units (recall 5 years ago) 0.03 c 0.01 0.03 c 0.01
No. of modern hives (recall 5 years ago) 0.05 b 0.02 0.04 a 0.02
No. traditional hives (recall 5 years ago) 0.01 a 0.01 0.01 0.01
Distance to Mekelle -0.01 a 0.00 -0.01 a 0.00
Distance to asphalt road 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Distance to RDO -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
Constant 9.62 c 0.54 9.76 c 0.64
No. of observations 393 393
F( 18, 374) 7.65 c F( 20, 372) 6.99 c
Adj R-squared 0.22 0.22
a,b,c indicates significance levels at 10,5 and 1 % respectively
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riding (members not taking care of collective beehives) and space problems. Members
are found not to invest their time in caring for the common apiary sites and some of
the beehives are found with no bee colonies. Honey cooperatives emerge once Dimma
initiated and transferred its apiary sites in 2007 to members nominated by the rural
development offices. Members formed the cooperative to acquire modern beehives and
other related technology relevant to honey production and harvesting. However, mem-
bers reduce their commitment to take their own share once the cooperative is dis-
solved. Moreover, the fragile commitments from the members exacerbate the lower
productivity of the beehives. As it was physically observed, honey cooperatives in the
tabias Menkere and Hayelom are found underperforming losing the colonies due to
lack of care from members. When cooperatives collect honey from their members, they
also suffer from traceability problems resulting in partial or complete rejection of the
honey offered to processors as it fails to meet standards. Lack of quality checking
instruments also affects the success of cooperatives. The success of dairy cooperatives
in the region has not been replicated in the honey producing and marketing coopera-
tives. Members in Atsibi and Ofla reduce their commitment to honey cooperatives and
are waiting for the distribution of assets from the dissolution. Therefore, many of the
members transfer the cooperatives’ duties to the management committee and members
fail to discharge the cooperative assignment prioritizing their own individual activity.
We can conclude that contracts offer better opportunities to honey producers than
cooperatives. Contracts facilitate the acquisition of technology and inputs and result in
better market conditions. They facilitate closer communication between producers and
contractors (processors or retailers), and reduce transaction costs in multiple ways.
While cooperatives also entail the potential to reduce transaction costs and result in
Table 6 Covariates used to estimate PS using the bivariate Probit Model
Covariates Contract Cooperative
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err.
Age, HH head -0.03 c 0.01 0.00 0.01
Illiterate, HH head -0.22 0.21 0.05 0.22
Household size 0.06 0.06 -0.13 c 0.05
Active family -0.00 0.13 0.15 0.12
Production experience 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02
Land size 1.19 b 0.56 -0.28 0.44
Land size2 -0.56 b 0.28 0.09 0.18
Tropical Livestock unit (recall 5 years ago) 0.01 0.01 0.02 a 0.01
No. of modern hive (recall 5 years ago) 0.05 0.03 -0.01 0.05
No. traditional hive (recall 5 years ago) -0.03 0.02 0.03 a 0.01
Distance to Mekelle 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01
Distance to asphalt road 0.02 c 0.00 0.02 c 0.01
Distance to RDO 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02
Constant -1.88 c 0.53 -1.17 b 0.49
Number of observations 393
Wald chi2(26) = 504.32 c
Wald test of rho = 0 chi2(1) = 35.77 Prob > chi2 = 0.00
a.b,c significance at 10, 5 and 1% significance level
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better market conditions, in the honey sector in Tigray they are not successful in doing
so, likely because of problems with management and incentives of producers.
In Table 5 the full regression results are given for the regression on covariates and
the regression on propensity scores for total household income as dependent variable.
The results indicate that apart from contract participation, other factors influence
honey production and income as well. We find that the location of households matters.
Households in the Ofla district have a significantly higher income than households in
other districts. We find a negative effect of age but a positive effect of producer experi-
ence on household income. Further, labor endowments and productive assets deter-
mine household income. We find that a higher number of active household members,
more livestock, and more beehives increase income of the households.
Estimating the propensity scores
The results of the bivariate probit model estimating the propensity scores are given in
Table 6. These results indicate that the age of the household head, the size of the land
and distance to an asphalt road influence the probability of producers to engage in con-
tracting while household size, number of livestock units, number of traditional hives
and distance to asphalt road influence the probability to engage in cooperatives.
Robustness and sensitivity
One of the important assumptions in propensity score matching is the overlap in the
distribution of the estimated propensity scores for the treated and the control observa-
tions. The boxplot presented in Fig. 1 indicates the presence of sufficient overlap of the
estimated propensity scores between the treated and the control observations. Some
observations are outside the area of common support but these were dropped from the
analysis.
Related to this is the balance of observable characteristics between treated and
matched control observations. As matching is done on the propensity scores rather
than on all the covariates, one has to check whether the matching procedure is
able to balance the distribution of the chosen covariates in both the treatment and
a b
Fig. 1 Propensity scores of the treatment and control group. The first caption (a) is treated contract, control
contract; the second caption (b) is treated cooperative, control cooperative
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the control group. The balancing test results in Table 7 indicate that significant
differences in the covariates ‘age of the household head’, ‘distance to asphalt road’
and ‘distance to RDO’ between treated and controls disappear after matching. This
indicates that matching results in more balance in characteristics between treated
and controls, which leads to good estimates.
Another important assumption is the Conditional Independence Assumption (CIA).
This assumption cannot be directly tested since the information on the counterfactual
is not available. However, Nannicini (2007)2 and Ichino et al. (2008) proposed a method
based on a simulated confounder to test sensitivity to failure of the CIA assumption. It
involves the use of a simulated neutral confounder or a confounder that mimics the
distribution of dummy covariates used in the computation of the propensity scores. We
use a neutral confounder and a confounder calibrated to mimic the illiterate variable in
the model. The sensitivity analysis result reveals qualitatively identical and
Table 7 Balancing properties of covariates in treated and control groups for kernel matching (Full
Model)
Variable Unmatched Mean Kernel matching Nearest neighbor
matching
Matched Treated Control Percent
bias
Percent
reduced
bias
t Percent
bias
Percent
reduced
bias
t
Age, household head Unmatched 39.91 44.19 -39.2 -1.96 b -39.2 -1.96 b
Matched 40.55 40.14 3.7 90.5 0.47 4.2 89.3 0.66
Illiterate, household
head
Unmatched 0.34 0.47 -25.8 -1.43 -25.8 -1.43
Matched 0.33 0.36 -4.5 82.7 0.09 6.8 73.7 0.57
Size of household Unmatched 6.51 6.26 11.6 0.69 11.6 0.69
Matched 6.55 6.51 1.8 84.8 -0.27 3.8 67.2 -0.71
Active family members Unmatched 2.51 2.54 -2.1 -0.13 -2.1 -0.13
Matched 2.55 2.50 4.1 -94.8 0.36 -0.5 76.6 -0.10
Production experience Unmatched 7.71 7.32 5.7 0.33 5.7 0.33
Matched 8.06 7.76 4.3 24.2 0.26 -5.4 6.2 -0.09
Land size Unmatched 0.95 0.86 19.1 1.02 19.1 1.02
Matched 0.95 0.90 10.3 46.1 0.03 4.9 74.2 -0.70
Land size2 Unmatched 1.13 1.03 9.5 0.47 1.03 9.5 0.47
Matched 1.13 1.04 8.4 11.5 0.04 3.8 60.5 -0.64
Tropical livestock units
(5 years recall)
Unmatched 4.52 4.33 3.3 0.16 3.3 0.16
Matched 4.67 4.26 7.2 -114.0 -0.18 3.8 -13.2 -0.86
No. of modern hives
(5 years recall)
Unmatched 1.57 1.15 18.3 1.02 18.3 1.02
Matched 1.67 1.38 12.6 31.1 0.47 -2.5 86.5 -0.36
No. of traditional hives
(5 years recall)
Unmatched 1.20 1.99 -17.8 -0.80 -17.8 -0.80
Matched 1.27 1.41 -3.1 82.7 0.26 0.6 96.8 0.89
Distance to Mekelle Unmatched 66.67 72.14 -13.0 -0.72 -13.0 -0.72
Matched 67.23 71.64 -10.5 19.3 0.11 -6.6 49.6 0.85
Distance to asphalt road Unmatched 29.79 19.53 58.4 3.34 c 58.4 3.34 c
Matched 28.41 24.89 20.0 65.7 0.23 14.7 74.8 -0.57
Distance to RDO Unmatched 5.14 3.60 27.7 2.35 b 27.7 2.35 b
Matched 3.70 4.06 -6.5 76.4 -1.53 -0.8 97.2 -1.68
a,b,c indicates significance levels at 10,5 and 1 % respectively
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quantitatively similar estimates of treatment effects, implying that the results are not
sensitive to failure of the CIA assumption (Table 8).
A final sensitivity analysis includes a check of the appropriateness of the covariates
used to estimate the propensity scores as the treatment effect estimate is sensitive to
the chosen covariates. Two basic models were run to check the appropriateness of the
chosen covariates. The first model estimates the treatment effect using all covariates
identified to adjust the selection bias. The variables are stable, time invariant, fixed and
measured before treatment (Caliendo and Sabine 2005). The second model is a re-
stricted model consisting of covariates that are significant in determining the choice of
contract or cooperatives from the full model. The two models yield qualitatively the
same and quantitatively similar results supporting the robustness of the treatment
effect estimate (Table 9).
Conclusions
This paper identified three basic marketing channels farmers employed to supply
honey. The paper also identified an increased use of modern beehives across honey
producers. Contracting honey producers are shown with a relatively large number of
modern beehives and they get transformed fast. Input and technology supply is largely
from ARDO but some buyers, processors, and other religious and development institu-
tions also participate in the provision of modern hives and extracting technology to
honey producers.
We indicated the positive production and economic gains honey producers obtain
from contract engagement. Honey producers under the contract scheme produce more
white honey fulfilling the demand of processors, buyers and consumers. Contracting re-
sults in higher production due to the better access it causes to technology and skill
transfers. Moreover, better conditions contracts offer motivates honey producers to
produce more to the market.
As the findings imply, contract farming is found offering improved incomes to the
honey producers which complement the existing literature on contract farming. It how-
ever does not find any evidence in support of honey cooperatives to supplement house-
hold income. This may entail that the effectiveness of vertical coordination
mechanisms is product specific.
It is inferred from the study that contracting offers resources and better market con-
ditions and we suggest that facilitating conditions that favor contracting in rural Tigray
may be considered to upgrade the honey supply chain. Strengthening enforcement and
standardizing institutions to facilitate contracting in the region may be considered an
option to improve the honey supply chain and the household income. Minimizing the
act of farmers to side sell by offering flexible and market based agreements may also
tighten the linkages of honey producers with contractors.
Table 8 Sensitivity analysis for robustness of the CIA
Model type I Treatment effect Outcome effect a Selection Effect b
Baseline 0.28
Neutral confounder 0.28 1.02 1.06
Calibrated confounder to mimic illiterate 0.26 0.94 0.59
a the effect of the calibrated confounder on the outcome variable (Income)
b the effect of the calibrated confounder on the selection variable (contract)
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Though changes have been realized in the modern hive use among cooperative mem-
bers, production and economic gains do not seem different from the situations of the
spot market users. As supplemented by the discussions with cooperative leaders, mem-
bers lack commitment to spend their time on the apiary site and there has been a
tendency of free riding (leaving the work to others). Traceability problems also affect
the revenue cooperatives could generate from what they made available in the market.
Many of the honey producing cooperatives under the study sites are not properly func-
tioning and they are in the process of reestablishment. Cooperative formation has been
seen by members as a simple source of modern beehives and credit, and members’
lower commitment to get their shares from dissolution.
The nature of the production system may also lend itself to the poor perform-
ance of cooperatives. Traditionally, beehives are placed within homes or backyards
promoting individual commitment. However, cooperatives are given apiary sites de-
manding frequent visit and follow up to which many of the members fail to com-
mit. In addition, lack of space and pesticide use around the apiary sites were
reported to be the reasons impeding hive productivity. In sum, contracting is found
to be instrumental for improving honey production, sales and income. However,
care must be taken in interpreting the result as contract and cooperative partici-
pants are small in number. Conducting the survey at larger scale may be relevant
to develop the complete picture on the contributions of contracts to honey pro-
duction and producers’ welfare in Ethiopia. As such types of studies are scarce, it
is difficult to have a benchmark to compare the marginal yield and the welfare
effect of contract participation. It is then believed that it may serve as a good
reference for similar studies in the future.
Endnotes
1This is the case because cooperative members are obliged to sell the entire market-
able output to the cooperative and hence cannot engage in other marketing channels.
2For the reasoning and the applications in STATA, see Nannicini (2007).
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Table 9 Sensitivity of ATE estimates under full different sets of covariates
Outcome variables ATE-Full Model ATE-Restricted Model
Hive productivity (modern) 0.44 b 0.42 b
(0.14) (0.14)
Honey production (white) 0.79 c 0.89 c
(0.20) (0.19)
Honey income 1.10 c 1.12 c
(0.26) (0.26)
Household income 0.31 a 0.32 a
(0.18) (0.18)
Per capita income 0.36 a 0.37 b
(0.18) (0.17)
a,b,c indicates significance levels at 10, 5 and 1 % respectively
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